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In a previous brief co-authored with Sandra 
Rios,1 we discussed the resilience of the 
“import-substitution paradigm” (and its 
protectionist toolkit) in trade and industrial 
policies in Brazil. This paradigm has existed 
for nearly five decades as the intellectual 
reference for the successful (at least until 
the late 1970s) Brazilian experience of 
industrialization, shared by a wide coalition 
of public and private players. 
 However, the deep economic crisis 
that Brazil has been experiencing for the 
last three years has made room for policy 
reforms in different areas, among which are 
trade and industry. Although the import-
substitution paradigm remains hegemonic, 
debates on trade policy reform and trade 
liberalization are no longer taboo and have 
gathered some support among policymakers 
(mainly from the Ministry of Finance), 
academicians, and a few business leaders.
 Regardless of the position adopted in 
relation to trade policy reform in Brazil, it 
is necessary to recognize that the domestic 
and external political conjuncture does 
not favor such a reform. On the domestic 
front, the government has focused almost 
exclusively on fiscal matters in an effort 
to reverse the deep deterioration of 
public finances at the national and the 
subnational levels. On the external front, 
the political mood is anything but favorable 
toward liberalization initiatives, be they 
unilateral or negotiated. 
 This brief discusses the outlook 
for trade policy reform in Brazil during 
President Michel Temer’s term (which ends 
in December 2018) and the challenges and 
dilemmas in the trade policy arena that will 
be faced by any succeeding government.
FROM THE TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
OF THE 1990s TO THE CURRENT 
SITUATION
During the first half of the 1990s, Brazil 
adopted a moderately ambitious unilateral 
trade liberalization policy. This movement 
was complemented by the consolidation 
of maximum tariffs for industrial and 
agricultural goods by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)2 and the establishment 
of MERCOSUR’s customs union. 
 Since then—approximately a quarter of 
a century later—no other trade liberalization 
moves have been implemented by Brazil, 
which sets the country apart from practically 
all other emerging economies, including 
China and India. Today, according to the 
World Bank, Brazil’s economy is among those 
most closed to external trade in the world3 
and has higher tariff levels in comparison to 
those implemented by other large developing 
countries (see Figures 1 and 2). 
 In addition, in 2010 Brazil started to 
adopt a broad range of protectionist industrial 
and trade policies that favored domestic 
production.4 At the same time, trade 
negotiations became less relevant before 
returning to the policy agenda in 2015, when 
the failure of the industrial and trade policies 
adopted in 2010 became evident. 
 As is well known, these policies had 
disastrous effects. To begin with, they did 
not achieve their main goals of defending 
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Brazilian industry from the increase in 
imports and of mitigating the ongoing 
deindustrialization process. Industry 
did not even return to its pre-crisis 
(2008) production levels, and industry’s 
contribution to the GDP continued to decline 
through the following years. 
 Besides that, the adopted policies—
especially the incentives granted to industry—
have contributed to the significant worsening 
of Brazil’s fiscal situation in recent years. 
This fiscal scenario limits prospects for the 
resumption of economic growth after more 
than two years of a strong recession. 
 As if that were not enough, a significant 
portion of the policies that were adopted in 
2010 was recently condemned by the WTO, 
the very trade negotiation forum historically 
prioritized by Brazilian diplomacy. 
 This is the situation at the beginning 
of 2017, approximately six months after 
the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, 
whose administration was responsible for 
the policies mentioned above. With the 
inauguration of a new president, discussions 
on the reasons for the failure of the 
developmentalist experiment have been 
gaining traction, fostering a debate on the 
revision of trade and industrial policy. 
 Consequently, Brazil’s economic policy 
agenda is changing to one that seeks to 
prioritize fiscal balance, private capital 
investments, and the growth of economic 
productivity. 
 As occurred in the early 1990s, the 
debate on trade policy reform has reappeared 
on the agenda as part of a wide “revisionist” 
proposal that resets the relationship between 
the state and the economy. This reset is 
obviously propelled by the collapse of the 
developmentalist growth model with its high 
social and economic costs. 
 However, there is no doubt that the 
political and economic circumstances—
both domestic and international—in which 
trade reform is again being discussed are 
currently unfavorable. Such circumstances 
make a more ambitious trade reform 
practically unfeasible under the Temer 
administration. Furthermore, they generate 
complex dilemmas in the management 
of a trade liberalization policy for the next 
administration.
SOURCE  WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2006 and 2014.
FIGURE 1 — MOST FAVORED NATION TARIFFS OF LARGE EMERGING 
ECONOMIES, 2006 AND 2013: SIMPLE AVERAGE (% AD VALOREM)
SOURCE  WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2014.
FIGURE 2 — TARIFF PROFILES OF SELECTED EMERGING ECONOMIES: 
TARIFF DISTRIBUTION BY INTERVALS (% AD VALOREM)
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THE UNFAVORABLE CONTEXT AND 
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
At the domestic level, the Temer 
administration—which replaced Rousseff’s 
after her impeachment—has made battling 
the deep fiscal crisis now consuming the 
federal government and many subnational 
entities its top priority. Fiscal adjustment 
measures and the reform of the welfare 
system will absorb almost all of the 
political capital resources of the current 
government, whose mandate will end in 
less than two years. 
 In this context, it cannot be expected 
that the government would lead the revision 
of trade policy, a subject that still faces 
strong resistance in the private sector and 
in several segments of society (business, 
academia, and policymaking). Even those 
who support trade policy reform recognize 
that the domestic political climate is 
unfavorable for change. 
 With almost no fiscal space for policies 
to support exports and within a domestic 
political environment that rejects unilateral 
measures for import liberalization, the only 
track currently available to trade policy 
reform is via preferential negotiations, since 
the multilateral options have stagnated. 
 However, an examination of the 
ongoing negotiations suggests that their 
evolution is happening at a slower pace than 
anticipated. Negotiations with Mexico, which 
were initially expected to conclude June 
2016, will probably be extended through 
2017. Negotiations with the European Union 
face significant political resistance in some 
European countries and are not likely to be 
concluded before 2018. 
 Generally speaking, in the field of trade 
negotiations, Brazil seems to be paying the 
price of its late entrance into the arena. 
Today, the country faces an international 
scenario that is adverse to ambitious 
trade agreements. Therefore, as far as its 
“negotiation track” is concerned, the trade 
policy reform agenda is stumbled not only 
by domestic constraints, but also—and even 
more so—by external restrictions. 
 In fact, in contrast to what occurred 
in the early 1990s when Brazil initiated 
its unilateral trade liberalization,5 the 
international political environment has 
become increasingly more unfavorable 
to trade liberalization and negotiation 
initiatives. This has been a typical 
phenomenon in developed countries, and 
the risks of the emergence of a protectionist 
surge or even a trade war have grown 
significantly since Donald Trump’s election.6
 Therefore, a review of the 
developments observed in the domestic 
and international spheres suggests that 
Brazilian trade policy will be subject to 
continued inertia over the next two years; 
that is to say, no major changes will 
occur, and trade policy will largely remain 
the same. Specific adjustments to limit 
protectionist excesses in industrial and 
trade policies and continuing with trade 
negotiations in the midst of resistance 
(both within Brazil and from other 
countries) will most likely constitute the 
core of the Temer administration’s trade 
policy until the end of 2018.
THE DILEMMAS FACING A TRADE 
REFORM IN BRAZIL 
Substantive changes in the orientation of 
trade (and industrial) policy will only be 
possible with the inauguration of a new 
president in January 2019, and such changes 
will obviously depend on the political 
orientation of the new administration. 
 On one hand, the perspective that 
Brazil’s economy will start to recover and 
grow in 2017 makes it possible to anticipate 
a domestic political environment that will be 
more favorable to the implementation of an 
ambitious trade policy reform in the coming 
years. However, if the new administration 
opts for a comprehensive revision of Brazil’s 
trade policy, some complex policy dilemmas 
will necessarily be faced.
 The first such dilemma concerns Brazil 
implementing liberalizing reforms in a 
world where the winds blow in the opposite 
direction, toward protectionism and a 
rejection of globalization. This pertains to 
a criticism that has strong political appeal, 
but it is hardly convincing considering that 
Brazil’s economy remained quite closed 
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the intention of the “negotiated option” 
via preferential agreements is to ensure 
reciprocity between concessions and gains 
for Brazil and to make liberalization more 
politically palatable, the chances that it will 
be effective are slim. 
 The third problem with this argument 
has to do with the perception that the trade 
reintegration of Brazil into the world economy 
is an essential component of a new growth 
model based on increasing productivity. From 
this point of view, the protectionist trade 
policy is one of the main factors contributing 
to the long-lasting “semi-stagnation” of 
the Brazilian economy and to the lackluster 
performance of productivity shown by Brazil 
in the last 35 years.8
 In addition, Brazil cannot wait more 
than 10 years until the agreements are 
negotiated and start to have an impact on 
the economy’s level of openness. In this 
sense, the reintegration of the Brazilian 
economy into the world would have to come 
about mainly through a trade liberalization 
process that should include the negotiation 
of agreements but cannot relinquish the 
unilateral dimension, which does not depend 
on reciprocity. 
CONCLUSION
Despite the resilience of Brazil’s protectionist 
policy and the “anti-globalization” wave 
gaining traction in developed countries, the 
debate on trade policy reform has been 
intensifying. An increasingly accepted idea 
is that even if protectionism helped Brazil 
to establish and grow its industrial sector, 
for many years the negative effects of 
protectionism have surpassed its benefits. 
 However, more significant shifts in 
trade policy will have to wait until the 
next administration takes office and will 
therefore depend on the results of the 
October 2018 election. Even if a future 
administration opts for ambitious trade 
reforms, the dilemmas it will face are 
not trivial and resistance to change will 
be great. Carrying out a substantive 
trade reform in Brazil will require the 
government’s conviction that economic 
openness will benefit the country regardless 
when the vast majority of the developing 
economies moved toward opening trade 
to the world. Therefore, trade liberalization 
in Brazil would only bring the country’s 
economy closer to the standards of 
protection present in the rest of the world, 
especially among emerging nations.7
 A second policy dilemma involves the 
trade reform model: should it be unilateral 
or conditioned upon reciprocity to be 
pursued through trade negotiations? In the 
current debate in Brazil, policymakers and 
diplomats clearly demonstrate a preference 
for negotiated agreements. According to 
the defenders of this position, preferential 
agreements should be the means of Brazil’s 
reintegration into the global economy, 
as they would ensure reciprocity to the 
opening of its economy. In this sense, 
such agreements would be a policy option 
superior to the unilateral opening of the 
economy by definition, as negotiations 
would ensure better market access for 
Brazilian exports in exchange for Brazil’s 
economic opening. This position also carries 
an argument with strong political appeal: 
why open the economy without asking for 
anything in return? There are, however, a 
few problems with this line of thought. 
 First, as previously mentioned, the 
international political environment—
especially surrounding trade agreements—is 
plainly deteriorating. Brexit and the United 
States’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership are clear examples of this trend. 
This situation jeopardizes the very idea that 
in a relatively short period of time, trade 
agreements would be able to reintegrate the 
Brazilian economy into the world. 
 Second, as the Brazilian economy is 
much more closed to trade than its partners 
(both small and large), any trade negotiation 
will be perceived in Brazil as asymmetrical 
and “unfair.” Other countries involved in 
the negotiations will be coming from a 
status quo that reflects already completed 
liberalization moves that generate lower 
tariffs, mainly in the industrial sector. Brazil, 
however, will be coming from a higher level 
of protection, which will have to be reduced 
substantially in order for the agreements 
to generate free trade areas. Therefore, if 
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of its partners’ reciprocity, and that the 
costs of such an opening can be managed 
by intelligent compensatory policies.
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